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SELF-DIRECTED DEATH, EUTHANASIA,
AND THE TERMINATION OF
LIFE-SUPPORT: REASONABLE
DECISIONS TO DIE
G. STEVEN NEELEYt
If one death is accompanied by torture, and the other is simple
and easy, why not snatch the latter?
It is not a question of dying earlier or later, but of dying well or ill.
And dying well means escape from the danger of living ill.
-Seneca, Ad Lucilium
Epistulae Morales, Epistle 70
The law surrounding death and dying has failed to keep pace
with medical technology.1 Medical science has made it possible to
sustain human existence past the point where the competent
adult might rationally conclude that life is no longer worth living.
Nevertheless, the current state of the law often makes it difficult,
if not impossible, for the individual to exercise unfettered control
over the act of dying.
The present dilemma results from a clash of ancient canons.
While the common law has long recognized the right of the indi-
vidual to be free from non-consensual invasions of bodily integrity
and has generally extended this right to include the freedom to
refuse necessary life-saving medical treatment,2 the law has
equally long been anathematic to suicide. 3 Although suicide itself
is no longer punishable and so is not strictly speaking a crime,4
attempted suicide is a crime in some states5 and twenty-six states
t G. Steven Neeley received the J.D. and Ph.D. from the University of
Cincinnati. He is an Attorney-At-Law in private practice and Adjunct Professor
at the College of Mount Saint Joseph.
1. Glenn W. Peterson, Balancing the Right to Die with Competing Interests:
A Socio-Legal Enigma, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 109, 110 (1985).
2. Natanson v. line, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960); Schloendorff v. Society of
New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
3. WAYNE R. LAFAVE AND AuSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAw § 7.8, at 649 (2d ed. 1986).
4. Id.
5. While no state criminalizes attempted suicide by statute, "[olne would
presume that in states such as Alabama, Oregon and South Carolina, where the
common law presumption against suicide has not been set aside, attempted
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and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico currently have laws which
prohibit assisting a suicide.6 Moreover, the prevention of suicide
has traditionally been identified by the courts and commentators
as an important state interest that may limit a person's right to
refuse life-saving medical treatment.7 This consideration is par-
ticularly troublesome in light of the fact that decisions to disem-
ploy life-support are too easily swept under the same rubric.
Indeed, the accepted legal definition of suicide includes: "[s]elf-
destruction; the deliberate termination of one's own life;"' "the act
of self-destruction by a person sound in mind and capable of mea-
suring his moral responsibility."9 Decisions to remove life-support
are, specifically, intentional acts which are virtually certain
to result in death. As an untoward result, situations have devel-
oped in which even seriously ill competent adults have found it
nearly impossible to compel the removal of invasive life-support
apparatus. 1°
Few courts have considered the underlying policy reason for
the state interest in the prevention of suicide." Those courts that
have undertaken such an analysis "have hastily concluded that
the policy behind preventing suicide is to avoid irrational self-
destruction. They then reason that because the decision of a com-
petent patient to forego treatment.'when death is inevitable and
suicide could be considered a crime as well." H. Tristrom Engelhardt and
Michele Malloy, Suicide and Assisting Suicide: A Critique of Legal Sanctions, 36
Sw. L. REV. 1003, 1018 n. 67 (1982). See also Catherine D. Shaffer, Criminal
Liability For Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 348, 350 (1986). But see LA
FAVE AND SCOTT, supra note 3, § 7.8 at 649.
6. Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone, and Balch, Suicide: A Constitutional Right? 24
DUQ. L. REV. 1, 98 (1985).
7. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); affd, 379 So.
2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980); Commissioner of
Correction v. Meyers, 399 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 1979); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re
Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
8. BLAcies LAw DICTIONARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990).
9. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1822 (2d. ed. 1990).
10. See, e.g., Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984); Bouvia v. Superior Court (Glenchur), 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986); Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C.
1985); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160 (Fla. Ct. App. 1978), affd, 379 So.2d 359
(Fla. 1980); In re Lydia E. Hall Hosp., 455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1982); In re Farrel, 529
A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987); State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989); McKay v.
Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
11. Martha Alys Mathews, Suicidal Competence and the Patient's Right to
Refuse Lifesaving Treatment, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 707, 736 (1987).
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the treatment offers no hope of cure or preservation of life' is not
irrational self-destruction, the states' interest in preventing sui-
cide is not implicated. This superficial analysis leaves open the
question whether a competent, nonterminal patients' refusal of
treatment that could improve or stabilize her condition should be
treated as a suicide."' 2 The scenario is further complicated by the
legal and psychiatric presumption that decisions to die constitute
prima facie evidence of mental instability. O'Dea lamented in
1882 that "[t]he impression prevails, though not to its former
extent, that suicide is, per se, proof of insanity: or, in other words,
that whoever kills himself must necessarily be insane, at least at
the moment of taking his life." i3 More than a century later,
Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone and Balch would still contend that "sui-
cide is almost always a product of emotional or mental distress"
14
and that "[t]he literature overwhelmingly supports the present
presumption... that those who propose to or do commit suicide do
so as the result of mental or emotional disorders or external pres-
sures."'" But if the state intends to prevent all "irrational self-
destruction"'6 and the bare decision by an individual to hasten or
bring about her own death is considered per se indicative of
insanity then, arguably, no nonterminal adult patient who could
"improve" or even "stabilize" her condition will be allowed to ter-
minate artificial life-support or otherwise summon death.
The purpose of this paper is to challenge the common legal
and psychiatric presumption that all decisions to die result from a
clouded mind. Indeed, a realistic and common sense view of the
issue asserts quite the contrary: namely, that self-directed death
may prove to be an optimally rational course of action in light of
an individual's circumstances and ends. While the state has a
legitimate concern in the welfare of its citizens and should seek to
prevent unwarranted loss of life, it should be loathe to force a
mentally competent adult to remain alive against his will and best
interests.
12. Id.
13. JAMES J. O'DEA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SUICIDE, 257 (New York 1882).
14. Marzen et al., supra note 6, at 106.
15. Id. at 107.
16. George P. Smith, All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted
Rational Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination? 22 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 275, 381 (1989) (citing Robert M. Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment
for the Competent Adult, 44 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1, 35 (1975)).
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SUICIDE AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INSANITY
Roman law did not undertake a classification of suicides into
sane and insane, nor did it make the question of sanity a material
part of its legislation regarding suicide.' 7 The first trace of any
such classification occurs in the Penitential of Theodore, Arch-
bishop of Canterbury, where moral blame is roughly apportioned
to the degree of sanity possessed by suicides at the time of death.Is
Thus,
If anyone be so tormented by the devil as to run to and fro, scarce
knowing what he does, and in that situation of mind should kill
himself, it is proper to pray for such an one, provided he were pre-
vious to such possession a religious man. But, if he kill himself
through despair, through any timidity, or from causes unknown,
let us leave his judgment to God, and not dare to pray (say mass)
for such an one. It is not lawful to say mass for one who hath
voluntarily killed himself, but only to pray and bestow alms on his
behalf. But some allow mass to be said for one who, impelled by a
sudden temptation, seems to have murdered himself through an
instantaneous distraction.' 9
In 673 the transmarine canons of the Catholic Church were
adopted in England at the Council of Hereford under Theodore of
Canterbury20 and the attendant condemnation of suicide was for-
malized in 967 by the Saxon King Edgar.21 Edgar's law was
"wholly ecclesiastical in character"2 2 and provided: "It is neither
lawful to celebrate Mass for the soul of one who by any diabolical
instigation hath voluntarily committed murder on himself, nor to
commit his body to the ground with hymns and psalmody or any
rights of honorable sepulture."23 To this penalty, popular custom
added the further punishment of dishonoring the corpse, which
eventually became incorporated as part of the law.24 This custom
was a carryover from pagan practice25 and reflected the air of
superstition which hung over suicide.
17. O'Dea, supra note 13, at 257.
18. Id. at 258.
19. MOORE, FULL INQUIRY p. 307, (quoting PAENITENTIALE THEODORI ARCHIEP.
CANTAUR., (Paris ed., 1677)).
20. NORMAN ST. JOHN-STEVAS, LIFE DEATH AND THE LAw, 233 (1961);
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAw, 257 (1972).
21. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 20, at 233; WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 257.
22. O'DEA, supra note 13, at 131.
23. Id. at 311-312.
24. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 20, at 233.
25. WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 258.
208 [Vol. 16:205
4
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss2/3
RIGHT TO DIE
The first English legal treatise of consequence, known simply
as Glanville, was published around 1187 and contains no mention
of suicide.26 Henry de Bracton's treatise, written between 1220
and 1260, largely incorporated the Roman law on suicide as
presented in the Digest of the Emperor Justinian. Thus, Bracton
charged that "U]ust as a man may commit felony by slaying
another so may he do so by slaying himself, the felony is said to be
done to himself."27 If one is accused of a felony and "conscious of
his crime and fearful of being hanged or of suffering some other
punishment, he has killed himself; his inheritance will then be the
escheat of his lords. It ought to be otherwise if he kills himself
through madness or unwillingness to endure suffering. "28 Else-
where, Bracton introduced the innovation that the personal prop-
erty of a suicide could be forfeit even if real property was not.
Accordingly, one who killed himself in order to escape felony con-
viction lost his entire estate, but "if a man slays himself in weari-
ness of life or because he is unwilling to endure further bodily pain
... he may have a successor, but his movable goods are confis-
cated. He does not lose his inheritance, only his movable goods."29
Finally, Bracton provided that no penalty would attach to the sui-
cide born out of insanity, for such persons could not commit felony
de se.3 °
The punishments inflicted upon the suicide were considera-
ble. Properly speaking, of course, the suicide was beyond tempo-
ral jurisdiction, but his soul was subject to eternal damnation, his
corpse became a target of indignity, and his survivors were met
with embarrassment, ridicule and the specter of financial ruin.
Saint Augustine warns that "no man ought to inflict on himself a
voluntary death, thinking to escape temporal ills, lest he find him-
self among ills that are unending ... inasmuch as the better life
after death does not accept those who are guilty of their own
death."31 Thomas Aquinas argues further that "suicide is always
26. Marzen et al., supra note 6, at 57 (citing RANULF DE GLANVILLE, TREATISE
ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND, COMMONLY CALLED
GLANVILLE (George Derek Gordon Hall ed., 1965)).
27. Marzen et al., supra note 6, at 58 (citing II HENRY DE BRACTON, BRACTON
ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 423 (George E. Woodbine ed. & Samuel
E. Thorne trans., 1968)).
28. Id.
29. Marzen et al., supra note 6, at 59 (citing BRACTON, supra note 27, at 423).
30. Id.
31. AUGUSTINE, I THE CITY OF GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS, § 26 at 113 (George
E. McCracken trans., Harvard University Press 1957).
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a mortal sin"32 and that the individual who intentionally repudi-
ates the life which was given him by the Creator, displays the
utmost disregard for the will and authority of his Master. Worse
yet, the suicide commits this act of defiance in the very last
moment of his life, leaving no time to expiate the sin through
repentance. "Even the person who destroys a fellow creature does
not renounce God to the same degree, 'for he kills only the body,
whereas the self-murderer kills both the body and the soul.' "33
The resulting Church pronouncement on self-slaughter was unwa-
vering, "and so supreme was her power that the law of Christian
Europe legalized her teachings."34
As the result of ecclesiastical condemnations of self-ordained
death "there came into existence the barbarous customs and the
revolting indignities which were practiced upon the corpse of the
suicide throughout the Middle Ages and which persisted until
comparatively recently."35 As Dublin and Bunzel provide:
The denial of Christian burial to the suicide was the Church's
final weapon of prevention. Many curious customs grew up in the
medieval Europe as a result of this prohibition. The corpse was
treated with the greatest indignities. It was dragged through the
streets by the feet, face downward and hung on the public gallows.
Sometimes the heart was removed from the body; sometimes it
was left in place, but a stake was driven through it as a mark of
disrespect. Very frequently the body was not removed through the
ordinary doorway of the house; either a special opening was made
for it or it was dragged out through a window or through a perfora-
tion under the threshold. Possibly this was a hangover of primi-
tive superstition which feared the re-entry into the house of a
malevolent ghost.
36
32. THoMAs AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 38 Injustice 33 (Marcus Lef~bure
trans., Blackfriars 1975).
33. Louis D. DUBLIN AND BEssIE BUNZEL, To BE OR NoT To BE 203 (1933).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 203-04. In England, the last suicide to be treated in this fashion
was buried in June of 1823. Id. at 207. Accordingly, "[t]he body was wrapped in
a winding sheet and brought out in a shell supported on the shoulders of four
men. It was then wrapped in a piece of Russian matting, tied around with some
cord and instantly dropped into a hold about five feet in depth. This was
immediately filled up. No lime was thrown over the body; nor was a stake driven
through the body. The following month a statute was passed legally abolishing
this custom." Id. at 208 (citing R. Henslowe Wellington, The Verdict 'Suicide
whilst Temporarily Insane,' in 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE MEDICO-LEGAL SOCIETY
78 (1904)).
[Vol. 16:205210
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Despite the wanton cruelty inflicted upon the sane suicide,
both the Church and the law were forgiving if the suicide were
performed non compos mentis. "Traditional Christian theology
has been developed on the basis that suicide, in general, is a per-
verse act of the will, and a conscious flouting of God's authority"
and yet "[i]nsanity has always been considered to absolve from
guilt."37 Indeed, "Roman Catholic canon law provides that ecclesi-
astical penalties shall only apply if suicide is committed deliberate
consilio." s Thus, compassionate clerics were tempted to presume
insanity as the motive behind suicide in order to spare survivors
the thought that their loved one was eternally damned as well as
to avoid perpetuating the stigma of suicide through unsanctimoni-
ous burial. There is further evidence that juries were apt to make
the same presumption in order to avoid inflicting undue hardship
upon the families of suicides. In a sermon on the Sixth Command-
ment published in 1772, John Jortin ventured to declare what
many people had been thinking. Since most suicides "have a dis-
ordered understanding":
In all dubious cases of this kind it is surely safer and better to
judge too favorably than too severely of the deceased; and our
Juries do well to incline, as they commonly do, on the merciful
side, as far as reason can possibly permit; and the more so, since
by the contrary verdict the family of the dead person may perhaps
suffer much.3 9
Richard Hey similarly noted that juries routinely evaded "the law
'rather than enforce a Punishment which appears to them so ineq-
uitable,-so severe upon the innocent,' "40 while Blackstone
reported "with disgust, that jurors behaved as if 'the very act of
suicide is an evidence of insanity; as if every man who acts con-
trary to reason, had no reason at all.' "41 In 1728 the author of
Self-Murder protested vehemently "against the over-frequent ver-
dict of non compos mentis as resting on an illgrounded supposition
that whoever is guilty of self-slaughter 'must of course be Luna-
tick' as '[t]he verdict nullified the effect of very desirable laws':
37. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 20, at 252-53.
38. Id. at 253 n. 1.
39. S.E. SPROTT V, THE ENGLISH DEBATE ON SUICIDE FROM DONNE To HuME
140 (1961) (quoting JOHN JORTIN, SERMONS ON DIFFERENT SUBJECTS 145-48
(London 1772)).
40. Id. at 151 (quoting RICHARD HEY, A DISSERTATION ON SUICIDE (1785)).
41. SPROTT, supra note 39, at 157 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
189 (1969)).
1994]
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very wholesome, merciful, and prudent Laws, design'd to brand
the Memory of the Self-Murtherer, to fix a Mark of Infamy upon
him, and entail that Part of the Punishment, which he hath put
himself out of the reach of, upon his unhappy Posterity, in order to
deter others from the like inhuman and detestable Practices.4 2
"In the eighteenth century juries increasingly brought in find-
ings of insanity in order to save the family from the consequences
of a verdict of felony; the number of deaths recorded as 'lunatic'
grew startlingly in relation to the number recorded as self-mur-
der."43 As this general reaction to suicide became more deeply
entrenched within society it strengthened further the underlying
presupposition that whoever would take one's own life must neces-
sarily be insane.
The assumption that suicide is per se grounds for a finding of
insanity was supported by early medical and psychological opin-
ion. O'Dea notes that the prevalent view of suicide during the
nineteenth century was that one who destroys herself must be,
ipso facto, emotionally unbalanced. Thus, he reports that in Mal-
adies Mentales, Esquirol held that "no one attempts suicide unless
during an attack of insane delirium"44 while Falrbt "adopted the
same conclusion, and asserted it even more emphatically than his
predecessor. "45 Similarly, we are told that in Du Suicide Con-
sidgrg comme Maladie, Bourdin "not only declared that [suicide] is
always a malady, and that all suicides are insane, but saw in the
42. Id. at 121. A Discourse upon self-murder appeared in 1732 under an
anonymous author. It is discussed in SPROTT, Id. at 119-121. Similarly, Caleb
Fleming wrote that "[s]uicide is a crime that is so very shockingly DEFORMED, as
not to have been discriminately noticed in any of the divine prohibitions; just as
if it was not supposable, that an intelligent rational creature.., could ever once
admit the shocking idea, the unnatural, abhorrent image." Id. at 137 (quoting
CALEB FLEMING, A DISSERTATION UPON THE UNNATURAL CRIME OF SELF-MURDER
(1773)). As a remedy, Fleming proposes that "[o]ther measures should be taken
to deter men from the unnatural, shocking crime of self-murder. -And I am
humbly apprehensive, that a stop might be put to the spread of Suicism, by
having the naked body exposed in some public place: over which the coroner
should deliver an oration on the foul impiety; and then the body, like that of the
homicide, be given to the surgeons." Id. at 138.
43. Id. at 121.
44. O'DA, supra note 13, at 258 (quoting JEAN ETrIENNE ESQUIROL, DES
MALADIES MENTALES, CONSIDR ES Sous LES RAPPORTS M9DICAUX, HYGIENIQUES
ET MgDICO-LEGAUX, 1838)).
45. Id. at 259 (quoting J.P. FALRET, DE L'HYPOCHONDRiE ET Du SUICIDE,
(1882)). For a concurrent synopsis of the works of Esquirol and Falrot, see
GEORGE ROSEN, History, in A HANDBOOK FOR THE STUDY OF SUICIDE, 3, 24-25
(Seymour Perlin ed., 1975).
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very precautions taken by many suicides to ensure the successful
execution of their purpose, unmistakable evidence of mental
unsoundness."4 6 Thus, "[t]he phenomena preceding the accession
[of the suicidal impulse] are constant; wherefore the sick prepare
for some time before hand, arrange their affairs, write to their
friends, choose the place where they shall die, artfully arrange
every thing necessary to the accomplishment of their purpose,
take every precaution to insure success."4 v Then, after much to
the same purpose Bourdin submits: "It is rare not to find evidence
of mental trouble in the writings of which I have spoken; for even
when the method of reasoning is sound, an exaltation of sentiment
is perceptible, a warmth of soul which borders on passion. "48
O'Dea writes in rejoinder that "[an 'exaltation of sentiment'
and 'warmth of soul' bordering on passion, are certainly not evi-
dences of insanity."49 Moreover, making a point of Bourdin, O'Dea
casts suspicion upon the logical rigor of arguments which seek to
prove that all suicides are necessarily insane: "He said suicide is
an insane act because the deeds that precede it must be of an
insane character. And he demonstrated this proposition by show-
ing that the deeds are of an insane character because suicide in an
insane act."50
A deeper investigation of the predominate psychological prej-
udice reveals that the alleged nexus between insanity and suicide
is founded upon a still wider assumption. The instinct for self-
preservation is one of humankind's strongest proclivities. It is
therefore supposed that by virtue of this instinct every sane per-
son must shun death. "But it will hardly be necessary to insist
that, however strong the instinct of self-preservation may be-
and no one denies its strength-it is not a reliable test for distin-
guishing between the sane and the insane."5 1 After all, O'Dea
notes, a number of counterarguments may be given: "The instinct
of self-preservation is not so strong as to keep men from exposing
themselves to all but sure death in some forlorn-hope on the field
of battle, or even to sure death, as when they surrender them-
selves for execution in some cause, religious, political, or what not,
46. O'DEA, supra note 13, at 259 (quoting M. BOURDIN, Du SUICIDE
CONSID2R1 COMME MALADIE (Paris 1845).
47. O'DEA, supra note 13, at 259.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 260.
51. Id.
19941 213
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in which they take an absorbing interest."5 2 Furthermore, the
"instinct of self-preservation, moreover, is preservative against
pain as well as death; but how numerous the examples of pain-
agonizing pain even-endured in some cause, in support of some
principle dear to the sufferer!"
5 3
The belief that no sane person would kill herself lingers
today. Yet, despite the historical association between suicide and
insanity, there is simply no convincing argument which shows
that suicide is per se proof of insanity. Particular acts of suicide
may be precipitous or even rash, and under a variety of circum-
stances one might legitimately infer a connection between
instances of self-destruction and some underlying mental illness.
But there is no way to show that all decisions to die result from a
disturbed psyche. When life's value has been spent, leaving only
misery and frustration in its wake, and the fully reflective self-
sovereign individual sees no glimmer of hope or meaning in con-
tinued existence, a decision to die may well prove the mark of a
sane and rational person.
But, granted that an examination of historical attitudes
towards self-destruction expostulates that the formula equating
suicide with an act of insanity is ill-founded, is there not sufficient
current medical evidence to suggest, at least, a correlation
between mental illness and the suicidal impulse? Is it not the
case that many persons who wish to die suffer from some underly-
ing emotional perturbation? Furthermore, isn't insanity a matter
of degree?-how deranged must an individual be before the state
is warranted in "protecting him from himself?"
LEGAL COMPETENCE
The law recognizes that "insanity differs in kind and charac-
ter, as well as in degree"5 4 and that accordingly, "it is not subject
to a precise definition applicable to all situations."5 5 As a rule,
however, "insanity denotes that condition of mind which is so
impaired in function, or so deranged, as to induce a deviation from
normal conduct in the person so afflicted. More particularly, it
denotes a mind that is unsound, deranged, delirious, or dis-
tracted."5 6 Insanity is defined as:
52. Id.
53. Id. at 260-61.
54. 41 AM. JuR. 2D Incompetent Persons § 1 (1968).
55. Id.
56. Id.
[Vol. 16:205214
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a social and legal term rather than a medical one, and indicates a
condition which renders the affected person unfit to enjoy liberty
of action because of the unreliability of his behavior with concomi-
tant danger to himself and others. The term is more or less synon-
ymous with mental illness or psychosis ... [and] is used to denote
that degree of mental illness which negates the individual's legal
responsibility or capacity.
5 7
While the test for competency applied in a particular situation or
proceeding "is governed to a great extent by the nature of that
proceeding and the statutes applicable thereto,"5 s in general, the
test is determined by the "capacity to understand and appreciate
the nature of the particular act and to exercise intelligence in its
performance."5 9 Furthermore, "[s]oundness of mind depends on
the general frame and habit of the mind, and not on specific
actions, such as may be reflected by eccentricities, prejudices, or
the holding of particular beliefs. Eccentricity is not the equivalent
of insanity, however peculiar it may appear."60
It has been observed that "Anglo-American law starts with
the premise of thorough-going self-determination" 1 and that "[n]o
right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the com-
mon law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person."62 The "right to one's person may be
said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone."6 3 As
conceptualized by Justice Brandeis:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signifi-
cance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions
of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.64
57. BLAciKs LAW DICTIONARY 794 (6th ed. 1990).
58. 41 AM. JuR. 2D Incompetent Persons § 1 (1968).
59. BLACis LAw DICTIONARY 795 (6th ed. 1990).
60. 41 Am. Jum. 2D Incompetent Persons § 6 (1968).
61. Natanson v. Mine, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960).
62. Union Pacific R. C. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
63. Id.
64. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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Moreover, the Constitution's commitment to personal autonomy
includes the right of the individual to make decisions regarding
his own welfare even if such choices appear unwise or even fool-
hardy to others. Thus, explicating Brandeis' immortal pronounce-
ment regarding the "right to be let alone," Warren Burger wrote:
"Nothing in this utterance suggests that Justice Brandeis thought
an individual possessed these rights only as to sensible beliefs,
valid thoughts, reasonable emotions, or well-founded sensations.
I suggest he intended to include a great many foolish, unreasona-
ble and even absurd ideas which do not conform, such as refusing
medical treatment even at great risk."65
The irrationality of a patient's decision does not justify a con-
clusion that the actor's capacity to make the decision was
impaired to the point of legal incompetence. Thus, the principle
question for review in Lane v. Candura 6 6 was whether a 77-year-
old patient suffering from gangrene in the right foot and lower leg
who refused to permit a necessary lifesaving operation possessed
"the legally requisite competence of mind and will to make the
choice for herself."67 The patient had originally agreed to amputa-
tion of the leg but then withdrew consent on the morning sched-
uled for the operation. She was discharged from the hospital but
returned a few days later. Responding to the persuasion of a doc-
tor, the patient again consented to the operation soon thereafter
reiterated her refusal. The rationale for her decision included the
factors that she had been unhappy since the loss of her husband;
she did not wish to burden her children; she did not believe the
operation would cure her; she did not want to live as an invalid or
in a nursing home; and that she did not fear death but welcomed
it. The testimony presented to the lower court suggested that the
patient was "lucid on some matters and confused on others."6"
Her train of thought would occasionally wander and her concep-
tion of time was distorted. She was hostile to certain doctors, and
was sometimes defensive or even combative in her response to
questioning. Although one of two psychiatrists who testified at
trial stated that the patient was "incompetent to make a rational
choice whether to consent to the operation,"69 the appellate court
65. In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F. 2d 1010,
1117 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 978 (1964) (Burger, J., dissenting).
66. Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
67. Id. at 1233.
68. Id. at 1234.
69. Id. at 1235.
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was careful to distinguish a medically rational choice from a deci-
sion lacking the requisite mental competence:
[T]he irrationality of her decision, does not justify a conclusion
that Mrs. Candura is incompetent in the legal sense. The law pro-
tects her right to make her own decision to accept or reject treat-
ment, whether that decision is wise or unwise.
Mrs. Candura's decision may be regarded by most as unfortu-
nate, but on the record in this case it is not the uninformed deci-
sion of a person incapable of appreciating the nature and
consequence of her act. We cannot anticipate whether she will
reconsider and will consent to the operation, but we are all of the
opinion that the operation may not be forced on her against her
will.7
0
Similarly, in In re Quackenbush7 a 72-year-old patient suf-
fering from arteriosclerosis and gangrene in both legs refused to
consent to a necessary amputation. The patient was initially
advised to have surgery but refused. Approximately two months
later the patient was hospitalized and signed a form consenting to
the operation. Later that same day the patient withdrew consent.
As such, the hospital petitioned for the appointment of a guardian
to consent on the patient's behalf. Testimony concerning the
patient's mental condition was elicited from two psychiatrists.
The psychiatrist representing the hospital concluded that the
patient's mental condition was not sufficient to make an informed
decision regarding the operation. In the words of the court:
The doctor's conclusions are that Quackenbush is suffering from
an organic brain syndrome with psychotic elements. He asserts
that the organic brain syndrome is acute-i.e., subject to change-
and could be induced by the septicemia. He bases his opinion on
the patient's disorientation as to place-not aware of being in a
hospital; his disorientation as to the people around him-not
aware of talking to a nurse and doctor during the interview; his
visual hallucinations-seeing but not hearing people in the room
who are not there, and the inappropriateness of his responses to
the discussion on the gravity of his condition and what might
result.7 2
70. Id. at 1235-36 (citations omitted).
71. In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1978).
72. Id. at 788.
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A specialist in geriatric psychiatry testifying as an independent
witness concluded, however, that despite "fluctuations in mental
lucidity"73 the patient was capable of informed consent:
Quackenbush has the mental capacity to make decisions, to
understand the nature and extent of his physical condition, to
understand the nature and extent of the operations, to understand
the risks involved if he consents to the operation, and to under-
stand the risks involved if he refuses the operation.74
The court agreed with the latter testimony, writing that "Quack-
enbush is competent and capable of exercising informed consent
on whether or not to have the operation."75 Despite elements of
psychosis, occasional hallucinations, general disorientation and
waning lucidity, the patient was sufficiently cognizant as to com-
prehend the nature and consequences of his decision. Accord-
ingly, Quackenbush underscores the general rule of law that
mental competence is determined by the patient's "capacity to
understand and appreciate the nature of the particular act and to
exercise intelligence in its performance."76 Competence is not
gauged by specific actions , 77 eccentricities, or the patient's per-
sonal predilections; nor is competence judged according to
whether a particular course of action is considered rational or pru-
dent by third persons.
REASONABLE DECISIONS TO DIE
Recent years have evinced mounting interest in the questions
of self-directed death, the active and direct disemployment of life-
support, and physician-assisted suicide. In an effort to combat the
judicial recognition of a constitutional right to choose to die,
Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone, and Balch have gone to considerable
lengths to argue that "the vast majority of modem courts have
conceived of the person who would commit suicide as neither a
moral reprobate nor a heroic practitioner of a civil liberty, but as
mentally or emotionally deranged or unbalanced"7" and that "this
presumption is strongly supported by the psychiatric, psychologi-
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. BLAcies LAW DIcTioNARY 795 (6th ed. 1990).
77. 41 AM. JuR. 2D Incompetent Persons § 6 (1968). It appears that a decision
to die, by itself, would not properly constitute grounds for a finding of insanity.
78. Marzen et al., supra note 6, at 105.
218 [Vol. 16:205
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cal, and sociological literature on suicide."79 The authors further
assert that "[i]f it exists[s] at all, 'rational' suicide is rare," 0 as
"almost all who commit suicide suffer from some mental disor-
der."8 ' But it does not require any great mental acuity to bring
quickly to mind numerous circumstances in which a decision to
die would prove to be not only the deliberate and competent act of
a sane person, but also the most optimally rational act in light of
the individual's aspirations and ends.
Consider, for example, the plight of Ken Harrison in Brian
Clark's drama, Whose Life Is It Anyway? 82 Harrison is a creative
and intelligent sculptor in his late twenties who, upon carefully
considering the prognosis that his paralysis from the neck down is
incurable, announces that he would prefer to die rather than
spend his remaining forty to fifty years confined to a hospital bed.
Because he is physically incapable of destroying himself, and
euthanasia is forbidden by law, Harrison's only hope is to demand
release from the hospital to be sent home where, without a cathe-
ter, he will perish of his own blood toxins. Although he has delib-
erated calmly and continually over the matter for six months, the
hospital refuses the request, and Harrison's continued protesta-
tions are lost in a maze of "no-win" scenarios. After all, because of
the psychiatric assumption that decisions to die are indicative of
mental illness, if an individual makes such a request, the request
itself proves mental instability and must accordingly be denied.
At one point, Harrison complains that one of the justifications
for refusing his request is a version of Catch-22. The term "Catch-
22" originated with Joseph Heller's novel of that name in which it
is used characteristically for a particular type of military rule that
places the petitioner in an inescapable dilemma, in effect barring
his petition a priori in language that falsely suggests that there
are conditions under which the plea could be granted, when in fact
those "conditions" are contradictory.8 3 Feinberg adopts this termi-
nology to suggest that "there are as many as four Catch-22 argu-
ments in Whose Life Is It Anyway? that beg the question against
79. Id.
80. Id. at 107.
81. Id. at 142.
82. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM To SELF (1986) (explaining Whose Life Is It
Anyway? A Play by Brian Clark (1978)).
83. FEINBERG, supra note 82 (describing JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (1961).
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Mr. Harrison and make it a priori impossible for him to prove the
voluntariness of his request." 4
The first Catch-22 argument concerns the question whether
Harrison's acknowledged clinical depression is sufficiently
profound as to impair judgment. Dr. Emerson believes the answer
self-evident: "You haven't understood . . . He's suicidal. He's
determined to kill himself." 5 As Feinberg explains:
The assumption apparently is that if a depressed person requests
to die that proves that his depression impairs judgment, and his
request therefore is insufficiently voluntary to be granted. This
argument suggests that only persons who are happy are capable of
voluntarily choosing suicide, and of course they are precisely the
ones who won't apply. Thus if you are unhappy you cannot volun-
tarily choose suicide, and if you are happy you will not commit
suicide. The conclusion: no suicide.8 6
The second Catch-22 argument closely resembles the first and
is similarly concerned with the voluntariness of Harrison's deci-
sion. In pertinent part, Dr. Scott reminds Emerson that "It's his
[Harrison's] life." 7 To which Emerson replies, "But my responsi-
bility."88 Scott rejoins, "Only if he is incapable of making his own
decision." 9 "But he isn't capable," insists Emerson-"I refuse to
believe that a man with a mind as quick as his, a man with enor-
mous mental resources, would calmly choose suicide."90 Scott
replies, "But he has done just that."91 "And therefore," interjects
Emerson, "I say he is unbalanced."92 Again the question is
decided in advance against the petitioner. Feinberg explains that
under this scenario Harrison's request
cannot possibly be voluntary, not because it fails to satisfy
independent formal tests of voluntariness, but entirely because of
what it is a request for ... [To determine] that no death request,
simply as such, could be valid is to apply a circular test. This
approach is very much like that of a college which, when inter-
viewing applicants for admission, rules out those who apply on the
84. FEINBERG, supra note 82, at 359.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 359-60.
87. Id. at 360.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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ground that anybody who could apply for admission here must be
unbalanced.' "9
As a corollary of the preceding, the third Catch-22 argument
occurs when the hospital staff psychiatrist warns Harrison that
his obvious intelligence weakens his case: "I'm not saying that
you would find life easy, but you do have resources that an unin-
telligent person doesn't have."9 4 This observation prompts Harri-
son's analogy to Catch-22: "If you're clever and sane enough to
put up an invincible case for suicide, it demonstrates that you
ought not to die."9 5 The reference to Catch-22 is apropos. Harri-
son must construct a convincing argument for suicide or else the
authorities will not grant his petition. But anyone clever enough
to argue such a position is precisely the type of individual who
ought not be permitted to die since his mental acumen provides
him with resources beyond those of the average person in kindred
circumstances. In either event, Harrison will not be permitted to
die.
The final Catch-22 argument is issued by Dr. Scott when she
senses Harrison's excitement at the approach of his judicial hear-
ing. "I think you are enjoying all this,"9 6 she says. "I suppose I am
in a way," Harrison replies, "for the first time in six months I feel
like a human being again."9 7 This exchange emphasizes the para-
dox: Harrison is never so much alive as when he is fighting for
death. But to make too much of this point is to impale the peti-
tioner on the horns of a dilemma: "If he enjoys getting what he
wants (permission to die), then he is not depressed and has less
reason to die, but if he is not pleased at his victory then he must
not really have wanted to die after all, and that casts doubt on the
authenticity of his prior desire. Either he is pleased or he is not
pleased. Therefore, he must not be permitted to die."98
The general predicament faced by the hypothetical Ken Har-
rison has already been mirrored in reality.99 For many seriously
93. FEINBERG, supra note 82, at 360.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 361.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Bouvia v. Superior Court (Glenchur), 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986); State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d
617 (Nev. 1990). See generally Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp.
1452 (D.D.C. 1985); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Ct. App. 1980), affd,
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ill competent adults-especially those facing irreversibly degener-
ative diseases-continued existence may well prove worse than
death. It is agreed on all hands that incompetents should be
restrained from unwarranted acts of self-destruction. But if the
bold desire to die presents prima facie evidence of insanity, then
any impulse toward death would prove itself symptomatic of
mental illness. Thus, the argument proceeds, that suicide must
never be allowed because most, if not all, suicides are the result of
insanity. But the evidence of insanity consists-at least in part-
upon the presumption that no sane person would want to kill
herself.
Thus, as we have seen, Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone, and Balch
suggest that suicide is prima facie evidence of mental instability
and that "this presumption is strongly supported by the... litera-
ture on suicide."100 Although the authors amass a considerable
compendium of literature designed to illustrate the rationale for
their psychological predilections regarding self-destruction, this
does not entirely avert the Catch-22 quality of the argument
which seems to establish a priori the aberrant nature of suicide.
In pertinent part, for example, the authors roundly declare
that "ninety-four percent (94%) of the population that commits
suicide suffers from mental disorder, although wide variations
exist in the type of disorder. The most commonly cited disorders
are the depressive affective disorders."10 ' While "[s]ome critics
regard the affective disorder as part of a normal or rational
mental condition," 10 2 the authors maintain that the very defini-
tion of affective disorder bars this conclusion:
"The essential feature of this group of disorders is a disturbance of
mood.., that is not due to any other physical or mental disorder.
Mood refers to a prolonged emotion that colors the whole psychic
life; it generally involves either depression or elation." Thus, in
applying the term 'affective disorder' one assesses not the validity
of a feeling, but rather the degree to which a certain mood misrep-
resents (or suppresses) the rest of the psychic life, including the
379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Lydia E. Hall Hosp., 455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1982); In
re Farrel, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987).
100. Marzen et al. supra note 6, at 105.
101. Id. at 112-13.
102. Id. at 113 (referring to Thomas Szasz, The Ethics of Suicide, 31 ANTIOCH
RaV. 7 (1971)).
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person's emotions, values, and thinking capacities at the time of
the suicide.10
3
Moreover, we are informed that the "psychotically depressed
are particularly high risk candidates relative to other depressives,
but they are by no means the only group at risk. Affective disor-
ders, of which suicidal behavior (acts, attempts, threats or
thoughts) is a universally recognized manifestation, include major
depressive disorders, dysthymic disorder, bipolar disorder and
depressive episode."1°4 Furthermore, the "bulk of research indi-
cates that just under half of the individuals who kill themselves
have well characterized depressive disorders. Further evidence
suggests that while most suicidal individuals would not be diag-
nosed as having an affective disorder, most are nonetheless
depressed."10 5 "Depression [itself] is an objectively verifiable and
diagnosable entity and.., its designation as an illness or disorder
is not purely arbitrary."10 6 Indeed, "psychologists view depression
not only as a perceptual or motor impairment, but also as a
decrease in optimal cognition. A depressive disorder is distressing
not only due to the dysphoric mood which characterizes it, but also
because it may significantly impair the cognitive function."107
Presumably, the authors would agree that depressed persons
should never be permitted to facilitate their own death because
they suffer from a "mental disorder"-"a clinically significant
behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an
individual and that typically is associated with either a painful
symptom (distress) or impairment in one or more important areas
of functioning (disability)."'0 8 Yet their treatment of the question
103. Id. (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 205 (3d ed. 1980)).
104. Marzen et al., supra note 6, at 114 (quoting MODERN SYNOPSIS OF
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 362 (Harold I. Kaplan & Benjamin J.
Saddock, eds., 4th ed. 1983) and AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 207, 210-211, 216,
221-223 (3d ed. 1980)).
105. Id. at 115 (quoting ELI ROBBINS, THE FINAL MONTHS: A STUDY OF THE
LIVES OF 134 PERSON WHO COMMITTED SUICIDE 12 (1901)).
106. Id. at 116, (referring to AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 205 (3d ed. 1980)).
107. Id. at 117 (citing TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 104, at 356 (1983)
and BECK, THINKING AND DEPRESSION, 9 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 324, 326
(1963)).
108. Marzen et al., supra note 6, at 111 (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 56
(3d ed. 1980)).
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of mental disorder in suicides is curious. The authors present a
crowded potpourri of psychological items linking various forms of
mental instability with the suicidal impulse and group a number
of disparate emotional aberrations together under the general
heading "depressive disorders" in an effort to show that suicide is
almost always the result of a clouded psyche. This classificatory
maneuver may prove less problematic if we allow that "individu-
als with other mental disorders display some or all of the charac-
teristics of depressive disorder, including but not limited to
suicidal activity" and "are no less disabled by these symptoms
than is one with an affective disorder."10 9 Moreover, even if "most
suicidal individuals would not be diagnosed as having an affective
disorder, most are nonetheless depressed," 110 and depression
engenders "cognitive distortions that may affect choices and
behavior to a significant degree."111 But of greater concern than
the authors' tendency to blur the subtle yet important distinctions
between the various types of "mental disorders" is their failure to
examine-in any degree of earnestness-the extra-psychological
reason or precipitating circumstance under which a person might
become justifiably depressed. As Feinberg provides, some depres-
sion is understandable,
even proper, rational, and justifiable, a state of mind any normal
person would experience if he were to suffer certain losses.
'Depression' is also the name of a clinical syndrome marked by
'affective disorders,' involving 'an accentuation in the intensity or
duration of otherwise normal emotions.' Psychologists have not
agreed on any simple criterion for distinguishing accentuated
affective states that are 'clinical' from those that are less extreme
or less debilitating conditions, but they often speak of a plurality
of symptoms, at least some of which are present in clinical depres-
sion, in addition to the depressed or 'dysphoric' mood (sadness,
gloominess) that is common to both the clinical and nonclinical
species ... If clinical depression is determined by the presence of
one or more of such symptoms in high degree, quite independently
of their cause or occasion, then it cannot be sharply contrasted
with that 'understandable depression' which is a 'perfectly
rational reaction to a very bad situation.'... And even if under-
standable depression is also clinical depression, it need not involve
109. Id. at 115.
110. Id. (citing ROBBINS, supra note 105, at 12).
111. Id. at 120 (citing Silverman, Silverman, and Eardley, Do MALADAPTIVE
ATTrrTUDES CAUSE DEPRESSION? 41 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 28, 29 (1984)).
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any distortion of cognitive function. To be sure, some clinical
depressives are also 'psychotic' (i.e., crazy), but most are not.1 12
Thus, for pertinent example, when Ken Harrison learns that
he will never leave his hospital bed under his own volition, he
becomes understandably depressed. Indeed, any sane and
rational person beset by similar circumstances ought to be
depressed, and one would have grounds to suspect emotional
instability in a patient similarly situated who did not respond
with symptoms of depression. Nevertheless, armed with a battery
of presumptions equating decisions to die with mental instability,
Dr. Emerson refuses even to consider Harrison's request, stating
in relevant part that Harrison is suffering from a depression and
is therefore "incapable of making a rational decision about life and
death.""3 In a subsequent judicial hearing, Emerson testifies
that under the circumstances "depression and the tendency to
make wrong decisions goes on for months, even years."1 4 Yet
under cross examination, he is forced to admit that there are no
objective tests by which to distinguish a medical syndrome from a
perfectly sane and legitimate reaction of depression and that he
must rely simply upon his many years of experience in order to
formulate such a judgment. The consulting psychiatrist selected
by Harrison's attorney does not dispute Harrison's depression but
testifies that the patient's attitude is not merely an outcropping of
clinical depression but rather that "he is reacting in a perfectly
rational way to a very bad situation."" 5 More pointedly, in
response to the diagnosis of "acute depression," Harrison himself
responds: "Is that surprising? I am almost totally paralyzed. I'd
be insane if I weren't depressed."" 6
In such extreme cases, there can be no doubt that reactive
clinical depression can distort the patient's judgment. But this is
not to say that it must do so, or that the depression involved
impairs cognitive function to the point of incompetence. Precisely
because some depression is quite reasonable and expected in light
of personal catastrophe, questions of competent judgment must be
decided on a case-by-base basis. To flatly assume that depression,
clinical or otherwise, necessarily imperils competence is unfair to
112. FEINBERG, supra note 82, at 355.
113. Id. at 352.
114. Id. at 352-53.
115. Id. at 353.
116. Id. at 355.
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the patient as it effectively deprives her, on a priori grounds, of
any opportunity to establish her case.
In fine, the approach taken by Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone, and
Balch seems to dangerously parallel the argument(s) advanced by
Dr. Emerson in Whose Life Is It Anyway? by effectively "stacking
the deck" against any patient who would pursue a direct and
active means of hastening death. The authors establish as a rule
the presupposition that suicide per se is prima facie indicative of
mental instability and thereupon amass a copious armory of psy-
chological literature associating suicide with various forms of
insanity. But because the ensuing presentation is devoid of any
real mention of extra-psychological precipitating circumstances,
the question is actually decided well in advance of any purported
"argument": If the patient wants to die and is agitated or
depressed, then he must be suffering from one of the many
"mental disorders" associated with the suicidal impulse or at least
possesses "cognitive distortions" which may impair his judgment.
But if the patient is not depressed to a significant degree, then he
is not likely to request the disemployment of life-support or other
lethal remedy, as his particular assessment of present and future
possibilities reveals to him that his life is worth living even under
such circumstances. In either event: no suicide." 7
The question under such circumstances should never hinge
upon such considerations as whether or not the patient suffers
from a possible "decrease in optimal cognition." Rather, the point
of inquiry should focus upon mental competence: the capacity to
understand and appreciate the nature of the particular decision
and its consequences." 8 Furthermore:
[C]ompetence should be defined by courts in a way that does not
deprive the potential suicide of the right to choose. It must be
defined with a view to securing for the subject the right to choose
to die despite the wishes of doctors, friends, psychologists, and
117. Under such premises one might further assume that since decisions to die
evince insanity, then anyone who is not depressed and nevertheless wants to die
is, ipso facto, insane.
It is worth emphasizing that the authors do not limit their attention to so-
called "depressive disorders" but rather seek to associate a broad spectrum of
emotional abnormalities with thoughts of suicide. The notion of "depression,"
however, is particularly interesting within the context of decisions to terminate
artificial life-support, as one would naturally expect that someone weighing such
a choice would be depressed.
118. In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1978); Lane v. Candura,
376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
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judges. The test of competence should inquire whether the subject
has the mental capacity to comprehend his predicament and to
evaluate the alternatives. Furthermore, competence should be
presumed; the presumption should be rebutted only by convincing
evidence of coercion, mental instability, or ignorance.
119
The weight of the many right-to-die decisions handed down thus
far evince that the courts seek no higher standard of mental acu-
men, as the basic constitutional freedom "to be let alone" is not
limited to "sensible beliefs, valid thoughts, reasonable emotions,
or well-founded sensations" but includes "a great many foolish,
unreasonable and even absurd ideas which do not conform, such
as refusing medical treatment even at great risk."120 If an individ-
ual is competent, then the state is not warranted in usurping the
powers within his self-sovereign domain even if his choice of alter-
natives does not appear optimally judicious to others.
There is no doubt that some decisions to die are the products
of insanity and persons so afflicted ought to be restrained from
unwarranted acts of self-destruction. But to suggest that a bare
decision to die-considered apart from any examination of attend-
ant circumstances-is itself prima facie indicative of mental
instability is grossly unfair to the patient as it places a nearly
insurmountable burden of proof upon him. How readily could any
so-called "normal" person successfully overcome a presumption of
119. Alan Sullivan, A Constitutional Right to Suicide, in SUICIDE: THE
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 229, 245 (M. Pabst Battin & David J. Mayo, eds., 1980).
Sullivan continues:
although competence must be presumed, the weight accorded that
presumption must vary from'case to case. The courts must look not only
to the testimony of persons who know the subject, but they must also
pay attention to his objective circumstances: his age, his illness, and his
prospects. As the subject's prognosis dims, the presumption of his
competence must be entitled to greater weight. Insofar as the subject is
shown to have viable alternatives to suicide, however, his presumed
competence must be examined with greater care. Few would question
the competence of a person's decision to die if he is old and suffers from a
painful, incurable illness. But if a person is young and healthy and
wishes to end his life, his competence must be scrutinized more closely.
This is not to say that courts should substitute their own choice for that
of the person who wishes to die. Rather, courts should apply a flexible
standard of competence to avoid the tragic results of insanity or
ignorance. The court's objective in both instances should be to protect
the right to choose by insuring the subject's ability to choose.
Id.
120. In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F. 2d 1000,
1017 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 978 (Burger, J., dissenting).
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insanity in order to prove that he was, in fact, sane? The pre-
sumption that self-willed death is exemplary of madness also
works in derogation of the common law rule that "[a] person is
presumed to be competent unless shown by the evidence not to be
competent." 121 The alleged irrationality of a particular decision-
even a decision to die-will not in itself justify a conclusion that
the actor is legally incompetent. 122 Moreover, many decisions to
die not only prove to be the sane act of a competent person but
illustrate an optimally rational decision in light of an individual's
aspirations and ends. As Richards argues consistently, the con-
cept of rationality ought to take "as its fundamental datum the
agent's ends and aspirations, which the agent organizes, evalu-
ates, and revises dispassionately in terms of standards and argu-
ments to which she or he assents as a free and rational being. In
this context, principles of rational choice are those standards
which call for the assessment of choices in terms of the degree to
which alternative choices better satisfy the person's ends and
aspirations over time." 23 Accordingly, "[e]ven outside such con-
texts as terminal illness, present death may be a reasonable
course for persons who find in continued life the frustration of all
the significant aims and projects in which, as persons with free-
dom and full rationality, they define their selves and in which the
choice of death may, as an expression of dignified self-determina-
tion, better realize their ideals of living than a senseless life of
self-contempt. " 124 Under this line of reasoning, many persons
would concur that Ken Harrison's decision to die was not only the
deliberate act of a sane man but also a reasonable decision in light
of Harrison's predicament and particular assessment of a "life
worth living." Similarly, numerous courts have agreed that spe-
cific decisions to die may be competently decided as well as under-
121. Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978). See also
Howe v. Howe, 99 Mass. 88 (1868); Wright v. Wright, 29 N.E. 380 (Mass. 1885).
122. Lane, 376 N.E.2d at 1235. See also 41 AM. JuR. 2D Incompetent Persons
§ 6 (1968).
123. David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Privacy, The Right to Die and the
Meaning of Life: A Moral Analysis, 22 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 327, 392 (1981).
Similarly, "rationality must be defined relative to the person's system of ends
which, in turn, are determined by the person's appetites, desires, capacities, and
aspirations. Principles of rational choice require the most coherent and
satisfying plan for accommodating the person's projects over time." Id. at 369.
124. Id. at 360.
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RIGHT TO DIE
standable under the circumstances. 125 But regardless of whether
third persons approve of a patient's decision, if he is competent, it
is his choice alone to make. "Why should a person be permitted to
implement a 'wrong' or 'unreasonable' decision to die? The only
answer possible is simply that it is his decision and his life, and
that the choice falls within the domain of his morally inviolate
personal sovereignty." 126 While it is clearly an indignity to
destroy others against their will, it is equally an indignity to force
a competent adult to remain alive against his will. "Human dig-
nity is not possible without the acknowledgement of personal
sovereignty."127
125. Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Bouvia
v. Superior Court (Glenchur), 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), State v.
McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (1989); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
126. FEINBERG, supra note 82, at 361.
127. Id. at 354.
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